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The Olympic Binding Arbitration 
Clause and the Court of Arbitration for 
Sport: An Analysis of Due Process 
Concerns 
Jason Gubi* 
INTRODUCTION 
International sports law is guided both by national policies and 
those of international non-governmental organizations, such as the 
Olympic movement.1  When disputes arise, there is a need to find 
an equitable resolution.  Because litigation can be time-consuming 
and often unsatisfying due to conflicting national laws, there has 
been a growing reliance on alternative methods of dispute 
resolution within the field of international sports.2 
 
A PDF version of this article is available online at http://law.fordham.edu/publications/ 
article.ihtml?pubID=200&id=2761.  Visit http://www.iplj.net for access to the complete 
Journal archive. 
* J.D. Candidate, Fordham University School of Law, May 2008. B.A. Political 
Science, The College of New Jersey.  First and foremost, I would like to thank my 
brother for being as close in spirit as he is far in distance—a better brother can scarcely 
be found.  I am grateful for the support and guidance of my parents throughout the years.  
I am blessed to have supportive family and friends that have given more to me than I 
could ever possibly hope to return. What is best in me, I owe to them.  I would also like 
to thank Professor Victor Essien for his advice and guidance in researching this Note.  
Special thanks to Bryan Lipsky and Andrew Glickman from the Fordham Sports Law 
Forum for their assistance throughout the editing process.  Responsibility for any 
mistakes or misjudgments rests solely with the author. 
 1 James A.R. Nafziger, International Sports Law: A Replay of Characteristics and 
Trends, 86 AM. J. INT’L L. 489, 490–91 [hereinafter Nafziger, Characteristics and 
Trends]. 
 2 See generally id. 
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Similarly, alternative methods of dispute resolution such as 
mediation and arbitration have become increasingly important 
forms of dispute resolution for sports-related issues in the United 
States.3  The Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act of 
1978, which requires America’s national governing bodies of 
various sports to submit disputes within the scope of the act to the 
American Arbitration Association (“AAA”) for review, has acted 
as a catalyst promoting movement in this direction.4  In passing the 
Act, Congress must have believed that procedural safeguards 
would still protect the due process rights of litigants.  Otherwise, 
the Act itself could arguably be said to be in violation of the due 
process protections embodied in the Fifth and Fourteenth 
Amendments.5  Thus, there is not a hotly contested constitutional 
issue involved when arbitration occurs in the United States 
between United States bodies since American arbitration bodies 
must still provide due process protections.6 
However, in order to compete in the Olympics, the 
International Olympic Committee (“IOC”) since 1996 has required 
all potential competitors to sign a waiver form agreeing to litigate 
all claims in front of the Court of Arbitration for Sport (“CAS”), 
and forego lawsuits.7  The CAS was created by the IOC in 1983, 
but was criticized for not being independent of the IOC; the IOC 
chose members of the CAS, which was financially and legally an 
arm of the IOC.8  In response to these criticisms by the Swiss 
Supreme Court, the IOC founded the International Council of 
Arbitration for Sport (“ICAS”) in 1994 to administer the CAS.9  
 
 3 Anthony T. Polvino, Arbitration as Preventative Medicine for Olympic Ailments: 
The International Olympic Committee’s Court of Arbitration for Sport and the Future for 
the Settlement of International Sporting Disputes, 8 EMORY INT’L L. REV. 347, 349. 
 4 James A.R. Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations in the International 
Sports Arena, 35 VAL. U. L. REV. 357, 358–59 [hereinafter Nafziger, Arbitration of 
Rights and Obligations]. 
 5 See U.S. CONST. amends. V, XIV, § 1; see also Urvasi Naidoo & Neil Sarin, Dispute 
Resolution at Games Time, 12 FORDHAM INTELL. PROP. MEDIA & ENT. L.J. 489, 495–96 
(2002) 
 6 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 506. 
 7 Nancy K. Raber, Dispute Resolution in Olympic Sport: The Court of Arbitration for 
Sport, 8 SETON HALL J. SPORT L. 75, 77 (1998). 
 8 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 502. 
 9 Id. 
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The ICAS’s role is to protect the arbitration process and financial 
independence of the CAS by overseeing all administrative and 
financial aspects of the court.10  The ICAS is incorporated as a 
non-profit, non-governmental organization in Switzerland, and is 
thus governed by Swiss law.11  Swiss law also, therefore, governs 
the CAS. 
The due process rights of American competitors in the highly 
contentious field of Olympic sport are thus only as secure as the 
Swiss judicial system ensures.  This paper will discuss problems 
with this requirement stemming from due process protections 
provided in the Fifth and Fourteenth amendments.  Part II of this 
paper will set a backdrop for this discussion by summarizing the 
international Olympic structure, relevant United States arbitration 
law, and the structure of the CAS.  Part III will discuss the 
Olympic binding arbitration clause, including the due process 
issues raised by both the Olympic binding arbitration clause and 
the CAS.  Finally, Part IV will make suggestions that could ensure 
that these due process concerns are addressed. 
I. OLYMPIC DISPUTE RESOLUTION STRUCTURE: 
Americans live and work abroad.  Foreigners live and work in 
the United States.  Nothing about this equation is new, nor is it 
new in the case of sports.  The modern incarnation of the Olympic 
Games is based on the ancient Olympics, which pitted competitors 
from differing city-states and across the Roman Empire against 
one another.12  It was an international sports competition.  Today, 
however, sports are a much more important economic activity.13  
American Olympians are often full-time, paid athletes.14  Besides 
the nominal salary of Olympic athletes, the endorsement 
opportunities available to successful Olympians further raises the 
 
 10 See id. 
 11 See id. 
 12 See Raber, supra note 7, at 79. 
 13 Cf. James A.R. Nafziger, The Future of International Sports Law, 42 WILLAMETTE L. 
REV. 861, 871–72 (2006) (noting that corporate influence in international sports 
competitions has expanded) [hereinafter Nafziger, Future of International Sports Law]. 
 14 Melissa R. Bitting, Mandatory, Binding Arbitration for Olympic Athletes: Is the 
Process Better or Worse for “Job Security”?, 25 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 655, 665–67 (1998). 
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monetary stakes involved.15  This increased monetary aspect has, 
in turn, increased the likelihood for conflict among potential 
competitors for the right to compete. 
The International Olympic Movement governs the Olympics.16  
However, since the Olympic Movement is a collective network of 
non-governmental entities, its rulings are not binding on states as a 
matter of international law.17  Rather, a desire to have a state’s 
athletes be eligible to compete in the Olympics has largely driven 
conformity with the guidelines of the International Olympic 
Movement.  This conformity can, in some instances, be said to 
have created customary international law, which is binding on 
states regardless of their participation in the Olympic Games.18  
This paper will discuss whether the Court of Arbitration for Sport 
has adequate due process protections to conform to American 
notions of justice.  Part II will discuss United States arbitration law 
related to international sports matters and the CAS after 
summarizing the structure of the International Olympic Movement. 
A. International Olympic Structure 
International sports law, like other types of international law is 
governed primarily by provisions of international conventions, 
international custom, and to a lesser extent, the general principles 
of law recognized by civilized nations, case law, and the teachings 
of the most qualified international sports law theorists.19  The 
Olympic Movement, governed by the IOC, is “the dominant 
institution in the framework of international sports law” because it 
serves as a catalyst for the development of international sports law 
as its rules and practices develop into customary international 
law.20 
 
 15 See Nafziger, Future of International Sports Law, supra note 13, at 866–67. 
 16 See Nafziger, Characteristics and Trends, supra note 1, at 490–91. 
 17 See id. at 491–93. 
 18 See generally CURTIS A. BRADLEY & JACK L. GOLDSMITH, FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW: 
CASES AND MATERIALS 486–91 (2d ed. 2006). 
 19 See Polvino, supra note 3, at 349; see also Statute of the International Court of 
Justice, at art. 38. 
 20 See Polvino, supra note 3, at 350. 
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The Olympic Movement is composed of the IOC, International 
Sports Federations (“ISF’s”), National Olympic Committees 
(“NOC’s”), organizing committees for particular Olympic Games, 
and the Olympic Congress.21  Along with local and national 
governments, these institutions govern international sports 
competitions.22  Unfortunately, the rules and regulations of these 
institutions do not always correlate with one another.  Even when 
the rules and regulations do correlate, the way a particular case 
would be interpreted by these differing bodies may not coincide.  
Thus, an athlete may be found to have complied with regulations 
by one body, but still be banned from competition by another.23  In 
this subsection, I will discuss these overlapping levels of 
regulation, beginning with the IOC. 
1. IOC Structure 
The IOC has been referred to as the “point person” of the 
Olympic Movement, and is responsible for the development and 
regulation of high-performance sports competitions.24  The 
Committee acts as a coordinating body, delegating the conduction 
of international competitions and world championships to ISFs and 
NOCs.25 
Perhaps the IOC’s most important function is the role it plays 
in setting international sports law.  The IOC, as indicated by its 
founding documents, is a non-governmental organization and thus 
has no power to create international law.26  The main way that the 
Olympic Movement develops international law is by states 
following the practices set forth by the IOC.27  In general, states 
 
 21 See id. at 350–51. 
 22 Id. 
 23 James A.R. Nafziger, American Law in a Time of Global Interdependence: U.S. 
Nation Reports to the XVIth International Congress of Comparative Law: Section II 
Dispute Resolution in the Arena of International Sports Competition, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 
161, 162 (2002) [hereinafter Nafziger, Global Interdependence]. 
 24 Susan Haslip, International Sports Law Perspective: A Consideration of the Need for 
a National Dispute Resolution System for National Sport Organizations in Canada, 11 
MARQ. SPORTS L.J. 245, 257 (2001) 
 25 Id. 
 26 See Polvino, supra note 3, at 351. 
 27 See id. 
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have voluntarily followed the rules, decisions, and practices of the 
IOC and the Olympic Charter, often incorporating them into their 
respective national sports law policies.28 
The IOC provides a basic framework that ISFs have to follow 
in order for a particular sport to be conducted in the Olympics.29  
While a particular ISF may be the official federation for more than 
one Olympic sport, the IOC only recognizes one ISF for a 
particular sport.30  This Federation, in turn, coordinates with the 
NOCs of nations across the world.31  Every nation participating in 
the Olympics has a national sports federation (NSF) or governing 
body32 for the sports it competes in, which ensures that a given 
sport is being run according to the standards set by its respective 
ISF.33 
2. Role of the ISFs 
There are a total of thirty-five ISFs.34  These ISFs serve three 
primary functions.  First, the IOC delegates the authority to run 
international competitions to the various ISFs.35  The second main 
function of the ISFs is in spreading the ideals, practices, and rules 
of the IOC.  In order for an athlete to compete in an Olympic 
Games, he must both be selected by his nation’s NOC and also be 
in conformance with the rules of the ISF for which he is 
competing.36  The statutes, practices, and activities of the ISFs 
must, in turn, conform to the Olympic Charter.37  Third, in addition 
to these general rules all ISFs export to the respective NOCs and 
National Governing Bodies (‘NGB’s), each ISF determines the 
 
 28 See id. at 351–52. 
 29 See Raber, supra note 7, at 82. 
 30 Cf. International Olympic Committee, http://www.olympic.org/uk/organization/if/ 
index_uk.asp (last visited Feb. 1, 2008) (noting that international federations are 
recognized by the IOC as administering one or more sports at world level). 
 31 See Raber, supra note 7, at 82. 
 32 Hereinafter, national sports associations responsible for administering competitions 
to determine who will represent a particular state in an international competition will be 
referred to by their alternate name, National Governing Bodies. 
 33 See Raber, supra note 7, at 82. 
 34 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 489. 
 35 See Haslip, supra note 24, at 257. 
 36 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 492. 
 37 Id. 
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rules by which that sport is to be judged, thereby bringing about 
conformity in how sports are conducted throughout the world.38 
3. Authority and Role of NOCs and NGBs 
NOCs are responsible for determining who will represent a 
particular nation in an international sports competition.  Typically, 
NOCs delegate to their respective NGBs the authority to hold 
competitions in order to determine who will represent the nation in 
international competitions.39  NGBs incorporate the rules for a 
particular sport as determined by ISFs thereby helping the spread 
of ISF rules to the local level.40  In this way, conformity with 
international practice is achieved and the ideals of the IOC are 
spread as NGBs conform to the dictates of ISFs, who themselves 
are embodying the principles and practices of the IOC.41  The 
United States Olympic Committee (“USOC”) is America’s NOC.42 
The USOC is responsible for supporting American athletes in 
general, and specifically, American Olympic athletes.43  Though 
operating under various names, the USOC, has represented the 
United States in all Olympic matters since its founding in 1894.44  
It selects and enters American competitors for participation in the 
Summer and Winter Olympic Games, the Pan American Games, 
and the Paralympic Games.45 
The Amateur Sports Act creates the authority for the USOC to 
act.46  Section 220503 addresses the purposes of the USOC.47  
Some of these purposes are: 
 
 38 See Mary K. Fitzgerald, The Court of Arbitration for Sport: Doping and Due Process 
During the Olympics, 7 SPORTS LAW. J. 213, 215 (2000). 
 39 See Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.A. § 220523 (1998) 
[hereinafter Amateur Sports Act] (delegating the authority to hold competitions in order 
to determine who will represent the United States in international competitions to 
National Governing Bodies). 
 40 See Fitzgerald, supra note 38, at 215. 
 41 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 492. 
 42 See United States Olympic Committee Charter § 1.4 (2006) [hereinafter USOC 
Charter], available at http://www.usoc.org/USOC_Bylaws_as_of_6232006.pdf. 
 43 Id. § 2.1. 
 44 Christopher T. Murray, Representant Les Etats-Unis D’Amerique: Reforming the 
USOC Charter, 7 VAND. J. ENT. L. & PRAC. 233, 235 (2005). 
 45 See USOC Charter § 1.4. 
 46 See Murray, supra note 44, at 233. 
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? to establish national goals for amateur athletic 
activities and encourage the[ir] attainment . . .; 
? to coordinate and develop amateur athletic 
activity in the United States, directly related to 
international amateur athletic competition, to 
foster productive working relationships among 
sports-related organizations; 
? to promote and support amateur athletic 
activities involving the United States and 
foreign nations; 
? to assist organizations and persons concerned 
with sports in the development of amateur 
athletic programs for amateur athletes;48 
Thus, the USOC has been empowered by Congress to act as the 
body primarily responsible for American involvement in 
international amateur athletic activities, as well as to coordinate 
America’s domestic efforts in the field of amateur athletic activity. 
Section 220505 of the code describes the powers created by the 
Amateur Sports Act to be held by the USOC.49  Part (c)(4) of the 
section creates the power for the USOC to recognize NGBs.50 
Sections 220521 through § 220528 deal with NGBs.51 
Section 220521 of the Amateur Sports Act provides for the 
general recognition authority by the USOC of NGBs.52  Section 
220522 provides eligibility requirements for NGBs to receive and 
retain such recognition by the USOC.53  Since American NGBs 
receive their authority from the USOC, they must conform to 
regulations set forth by the USOC.  However, in order to be an 
official representative of a nation with an ISF, NGBs must also 
conform to the dictates of that ISF.  There is thus a dual level of 
regulation to which NGBs must conform in order for the athletes 
 
 47 See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C.A. § 220523 (1998). 
 48 Id. 
 49 Id. § 220505. 
 50 Id. § 220505(c)(4). 
 51 Id. §§ 220521–28. 
 52 Id. § 220521. 
 53 Id. § 220522. 
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served by a particular NGB to be eligible to compete in 
international competition. 
Section 220523 establishes the power that NGBs receive upon 
recognition as a NGB by the USOC.54  NGBs represent the United 
States in ISFs; select teams for international competitions other 
than the Olympics, Paralympic Games, and the Pan-American 
Games and make recommendations to the USOC as to who should 
represent the United States for these competitions; and coordinate 
and conduct amateur athletic activities in the United States.55  For 
an amateur athletic association to hold a competition, it must 
receive a sanction to do so by its NGB.56  The title ‘national 
governing body’ is thus apt because NGBs coordinate all amateur 
athletic activity for a particular sport in the country. 
Through this overlapping structure of authority, amateur 
athletes across the globe from the remotest villages to the largest 
cities are subject to the same rules and regulations for a particular 
sport as well as the ideals of the IOC.  Because international 
athletic competition has become such a large business enterprise, 
there has been an increasing level of disputes in recent years.57  
When disputes arise in the United States in consideration of 
amateur athletic competition, there is a strong preference in the law 
for such conflicts to be resolved outside of the courts.58  As Judge 
Posner once said, “there can be few less suitable bodies than the 
federal courts for determining the eligibility, or procedures for 
determining the eligibility, of athletes to participate in the Olympic 
Games.”59  I will next discuss United States arbitration law that is 
particularly related to amateur athletic competition because 
arbitration is an alternative to litigation. 
 
 54 Id. § 220523. 
 55 Id. 
 56 Id. § 220525. 
 57 Cf. Nafziger, Future of International Sports Law, supra note 13, at 872 (noting that 
“corporate intervention in the sports arena generates conflicts”). 
 58 See Nafziger, Arbitration of Rights and Obligations, supra note 4, at 358–59. 
 59 Michels v. U.S. Olympic Comm., 741 F.2d 155, 159 (Ill. 1984). 
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B. United States Arbitration Law 
Litigation can be expensive and time-consuming.  In the 
context of determining who will represent a nation in an 
international sports competition, the time that a lawsuit can take 
will often conflict with the need for a quick resolution of the 
dispute in order for a NOC to submit a list of competitors for a 
particular event.60  Binding arbitration presents an opportunity to 
more quickly resolve such disputes.61  The Convention on the 
Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, the 
Federal Arbitration Act, and the Ted Stevens Olympic and 
Amateur Sports Act are important aspects of United States 
arbitration law as it relates to international sports competition. 
1. Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards 
The Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of 
Foreign Arbitral Awards is an international convention requiring 
signatory states to enforce the arbitration judgments of other 
states.62  A member state is bound under the Convention to 
recognize arbitration rulings from other states regardless of 
whether the state in which the arbitration hearing occurred adheres 
to the Convention.63  A few exceptions to this enforcement 
requirement exist.  Under Article V of the Convention, an 
arbitration ruling does not have to be enforced if doing so would be 
against the public policy of a given state.64  Rulings also do not 
have to be enforced if the arbitration panel acted against its own 
stated rules or there is reason to believe one of the arbitrators may 
have been biased based on his actions or his failure to disclose a 
potential conflict of interest.65  Finally, courts do not have to 
 
 60 See Bitting, supra note 14, at 660. 
 61 See id. at 662–64. 
 62 Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Arbitral Awards, June 
10, 1958, 21 U.S.T. 2517, 330 U.N.T.S 38 [hereinafter New York Convention]. 
 63 See id. art. I. 
 64 See id. art. V(2)(b); see also Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 494. 
 65 See New York Convention, supra note 62, art. V(1)(a) & (d); see also Naidoo & 
Sarin, supra note 5, at 494. 
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enforce foreign arbitration rulings when the court system where the 
arbitration was held has vacated the judgment.66 
In order to be a member of a United States NGB, and thereby 
eligible to be selected to represent the United States in 
international competition, one must agree to arbitration as per the 
provisions of the Amateur Sports Act.67  Once selected to compete, 
all Olympic athletes must sign a form agreeing to submit all 
disputes to the CAS.68  Since the court is incorporated in 
Switzerland, the CAS applies Swiss law by default.69  Because the 
CAS is a foreign arbitration body, the New York Convention 
makes rulings of the CAS binding on American courts unless one 
of the previously stated exceptions to enforcement can be invoked.  
Therefore, one who is challenging an IOC determination 
concerning his eligibility to compete in the Olympic Games is 
bound by CAS determinations without a right of appeal because 
the New York Convention compels enforcement of CAS rulings by 
United States courts.  The United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 
commonly known as the Federal Arbitration Act, works in 
conjunction with the New York Convention to see that foreign 
arbitration awards are enforced in United States jurisdictions.70 
2. Federal Arbitration Act 
The United States Arbitration Act of 1925 (“FAA”) provides 
for the specific enforcement of arbitration agreements.71  Section 2 
of the FAA limits the scope of the New York Convention as 
applied in the United States by stating that an arbitration agreement 
is valid “save upon such grounds as exist at law or in equity for the 
revocation of any contract.”72  Since American contract law is a 
creature of state law, grounds for revocation of any contractual 
 
 66 See New York Convention, supra note 62, art. V(1)(e); see also Naidoo & Sarin, 
supra note 5, at 494. 
 67 See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220522 (2006). 
 68 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 493; see also Fitzgerald, supra note 38, at 238. 
 69 See Fitzgerald, supra note 38, at 237. 
 70 See United States Arbitration Act of 1925, 9 U.S.C. §§ 2–3 (1925) [hereinafter 
FAA]; see also New York Convention, supra note 62, arts. I, III. 
 71 See generally FAA, 9 U.S.C. §§ 1–16; see also, Richard Bales & Jason F. Darnall, 
Arbitral Discovery of Non-Parties, 2001 J. DISP. RESOL. 321, 321 (2001). 
 72 See FAA, 9 U.S.C. § 2. 
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provision stem from state law sources.73  This provision is similar 
to the aforementioned provision limiting the scope of the New 
York Convention that states are not bound to recognize arbitration 
decisions that are adverse to the public policy of that state. 
The objective of the New York Convention should not 
therefore be viewed as achieving full recognition of every foreign 
arbitration decision, but rather, as both prohibiting states from 
taking affirmative steps to prevent foreign recognition and also 
promoting a more stable system for arbitration in the international 
context.  In addition to the New York Convention and the FAA, 
the Amateur Sports Act also has a substantial effect on the way 
sports disputes are resolved. 
3. Ted Stevens Olympic and Amateur Sports Act 
The Amateur Sports Act was updated in 1998 for a number of 
reasons, including the desire to protect the USOC against lawsuits 
for situations in which an athlete’s right to participate in the 
Olympic Games is at stake.74  The Amateur Sports Act establishes 
the authority for the USOC to act as America’s representative for 
international amateur sports competitions.75  It also sets up the 
hierarchical system whereby NGBs coordinate amateur athletic 
activity for particular sports and act as the liaison with ISFs.76  In 
addition to these primary functions, the Amateur Sports Act also 
compels the use of arbitration to resolve disputes between NGBs 
and the USOC, as well as between amateur athletes and their 
respective NGBs.77 
Section 220503 of the Amateur Sports Act lists providing 
“swift resolution of conflicts and disputes involving amateur 
athletes, national governing bodies, and amateur sports 
organizations” and protecting “the opportunity of any amateur 
 
 73 See JOSEPH M. PERILLO, CALAMARI AND PERILLO ON CONTRACTS § 1.6 (5th ed. 2003).  
For discussion on whether the Olympic binding arbitration may be voided by American 
courts because it violates common law contractual doctrines, see Naidoo and Sarin, supra 
note 5, at 503–05. 
 74 See Murray, supra note 46, at 233. 
 75 See generally Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. §§ 220503, 220505 (2006). 
 76 See generally id. §§ 220505, 220521–28. 
 77 See generally id. §§ 220522, 220527, 220529. 
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athlete . . . to participate in amateur athletic competition” as two of 
the purposes of the USOC.78  However, this mandate of § 220503 
seems to be contradicted by the prohibition of lawsuits provided in 
§ 220509 of the Act. 
Subsection (a) of § 220509 of the Amateur Sports Act prevents 
a prospective athlete hoping to represent the United States in 
international competition from bringing a lawsuit within twenty-
one days of the beginning of such competition.79  In order for 
subsection (a) to be invoked, the USOC must certify to a court 
where a lawsuit is brought that it cannot provide for the resolution 
of such dispute prior to the beginning of such competition.80  
Unfortunately for the athlete who feels his opportunity to compete 
has been unfairly restricted, this is exactly the situation in which 
such a prospective competitor would need injunctive protection 
from a court.  The USOC’s desire for timely resolution of 
conflicts, so as to not interfere with the selection of competitors for 
international competitions, is directly in conflict with prospective 
competitors’ desire to uphold their rights when they feel their 
exclusion is unjust.  While binding arbitration may yield swift 
resolution of disputes, it may not be the best way to protect the 
opportunity of amateur athletes to compete for reasons that will be 
discussed in Part III of this paper. 
Section 220529 states that one who is aggrieved under § 
220527 has the right to arbitration under the AAA.81  Section 
220527 deals with a member’s complaint against his or her 
respective NGB.82  If a member of a NGB believes his NGB has 
violated a provision of §§ 220522, 220524, or 220525 of the 
Amateur Sports Act, once NGB appeal mechanisms are exhausted, 
he or she is entitled to a hearing before the USOC.83  An 
unfavorable decision in this hearing can then be appealed to the 
AAA as per § 220529.84 
 
 78 Id. § 220503. 
 79 Id. § 220509. 
 80 Id. 
 81 See id. §§ 220527, 220529. 
 82 See id. § 220527. 
 83 Id. 
 84 See id. § 220529. 
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Under § 220522, in addition to other requirements, an amateur 
sports organization can only be recognized as a NGB if it agrees to 
binding arbitration for all disputes concerning the right of its 
members to compete in international competition.85  The NGB 
must not unfairly restrict membership and must also provide “an 
equal opportunity to . . . participate in amateur athletic 
competition, without discrimination . . . and with fair notice and 
opportunity for a hearing . . . before declaring the individual 
ineligible to participate.”86 
Section 220524 addresses the duties of NGBs.87  Violation of 
the obligation to inform amateurs of applicable rules and rule 
changes in a timely manner, for example, is grounds for 
challenging NGB recommendations regarding who should compete 
in a particular international competition.88  Section 220525 deals 
with NGBs holding international competitions in the United States; 
more importantly, it deals with the sponsoring of athlete trips to 
participate in international competitions outside of the United 
States.89  Failure of a NGB to act in a timely manner in deciding 
whether or not to grant the sanction for an athlete to compete can 
have grave repercussions for an Olympic hopeful.  As such, an 
athlete can challenge his NGB’s decision of whether to grant the 
sanction, or its failure to act in a timely manner in so deciding, 
before the USOC.90 
The Amateur Sports Act deals with the rights and obligations 
of the USOC and NGBs, and creates a right to arbitration while in 
some situations prohibiting lawsuits.91  This act can not, however, 
be viewed in isolation.  In combination with the New York 
Convention and the FAA, the Amateur Sports Act both makes 
decisions of the AAA binding and also prevents an aggrieved party 
from bringing a lawsuit in the context of disputes arising 
immediately before the onset of international competition. 
 
 85 See id. § 220522. 
 86 Id. 
 87 See id. § 220524. 
 88 Id. 
 89 See id. § 220525. 
 90 See id. 
 91 See generally id. §§ 220509, 220522, 220524–25, 220527–29. 
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In order to be recognized as a NGB, an organization must agree 
to binding arbitration when one of its members is challenging a 
decision as to who the USOC is recognizing as the United States 
representative in an international competition.92  After the IOC 
created the requirement that all competitors agree to binding 
arbitration before the CAS, the IOC persuaded all thirty-five ISFs 
to agree to the IOC supported dispute resolution process, 
effectively preventing any dissent by competitors from 
materializing.93  The USOC is legislatively required to ensure that 
the United States will be in compliance with the requirements of 
bodies such as the IOC.94  Since the IOC requires athletes to agree 
to binding arbitration, a failure by the USOC to promote such 
acceptance may not be in keeping with its congressional mandate.  
Thus, it could be argued that the Amateur Sports Act prohibition 
against lawsuits in the period immediately preceding international 
competition is merely a response to the Olympic requirement that 
athletes consent to binding arbitration when challenging a decision 
regarding their right to compete. 
Analysis of the Olympic binding arbitration clause is thus 
necessary.  Two main questions presented by the Olympic binding 
arbitration clause are whether American courts would strike the 
provision for offending common law contract principles and 
whether it violates constitutional due process protections.  
Contractually, the provision may be attacked for (1) being a 
contract of adhesion, or (2) one that was fostered by parties in 
unequal bargaining position, because of the concepts of (3) 
unconscionability and (4) duress, (5) the capacity of the parties, or 
(6) for being an unlawful restraint of trade.95  While analysis of the 
provision in the context of international athletic competition can 
illuminate whether American courts would uphold the provision, 
analysis of the structure of the CAS is needed to determine 
whether it violates American due process protections. 
 
 92 See id. § 220522. 
 93 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 495. 
 94 See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220503 (2006). 
 95 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 503–05; see also Bitting, supra note 14, at 667–
70. 
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C. The Court of Arbitration for Sport 
CAS Secretary General Matthieu Reeb has pointed to two main 
objectives leading to the creation of the court.  First, at the 
beginning of the 1980s, an increase in the number of international 
sports-related disputes combined with the absence of an 
independent authority with expertise and authority to handle such 
matters led to the conclusion that some sort of authority with the 
ability to set binding rulings was necessary.96  A second main 
objective of the IOC in creating the CAS was to settle disputes 
quickly and inexpensively.97 
The IOC held these goals (a) because litigation can be both 
costly and lengthy and (b) because it believed the efficient 
resolution of disputes by a recognized binding authority to be 
essential in order to further the objectives of the Olympic Games.98  
However, without a mechanism for potential competitors to have a 
meaningful venue to seek a redress of their grievances, spectator 
faith in the fairness of the Games would likely wane.  Thus the 
court is charged with efficiently and fairly settling disputes both so 
that competitors feel their rights are not being trampled, and also 
so that a fair and accurate result is achieved. 
1. History and Structure of the CAS 
The history of the CAS can be divided into two periods: the 
first dates from the inception of the court in 1983 until 
amendments to its structure were made in 1994.  Prior to these 
changes made through the Agreement concerning the constitution 
of the International Council of Arbitration for Sport (‘Paris 
Agreement’), the court was a body of the IOC.99  The CAS was 
composed of sixty members, with fifteen members apiece 
appointed by the IOC, the ISFs, the NOCs, and the IOC President, 
with the budget supplied by the IOC.100  The IOC, at the proposal 
 
 96 See Matthieu Reeb, The Court of Arbitration for Sport, http://www.tas-cas.org/en/ 
histoire/histoireA.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 97 See id. 
 98 See Bitting, supra note 14, at 663–64. 
 99 See Reeb, supra note 96. 
 100 See id. 
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of the IOC Executive Board, had the sole authority to amend the 
statute governing CAS proceedings.101  Beginning in 1991, the 
CAS published a guide to arbitration that included model 
arbitration clauses.  One such clause was for use by sports 
federations.102  This clause led to the development of the CAS as a 
body for parties to appeal the decisions made by the sports 
federations to which they belonged.103 
The International Equestrian Federation (“FEI”) was the first 
sports federation to adopt the aforementioned arbitration clause.104  
Elmar Gundel, one of its members, filed an appeal with the CAS, 
challenging a decision by the FEI.105  Unsatisfied with the result 
before the CAS, Gundel subsequently filed an appeal with the 
Swiss Federal Tribunal challenging the court’s impartiality and 
independence.106  Though the Swiss Federal Tribunal found that 
the CAS was a true court of arbitration for purposes of the case 
before it, its ruling indicated concern that the CAS may not be 
sufficiently independent, and thus possibly not impartial, if the 
IOC was one of the parties.107 
As a result of these concerns, the structure of the CAS was 
modified to make it independent of the IOC.108  In order to achieve 
this end, the ICAS was created with the purpose of running and 
funding the CAS.109  The number of CAS arbitrators was also 
expanded with the power to appoint them given to the ICAS.110  
Rather than have a set number of arbitrators selected by the IOC, 
ISFs, NOCs, and the IOC President, all arbitrators are appointed by 
the ICAS upon proposal by the IOC, ISFs, NOCs, and at its own 
behest.111  One of the more important reforms was changing the 
process whereby the CAS hears arbitration proceedings. 
 
 101 See id. 
 102 See id. 
 103 See id. 
 104 See id. 
 105 See id. 
 106 See id. 
 107 See id. 
 108 See id. 
 109 See id. 
 110 See id. 
 111 See id. 
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Before the Paris Agreement, the CAS did not draw a 
distinction between arbitration cases brought in the first instance 
between parties and those brought on appeal.  Now there is a clear 
distinction between the two main procedures of the CAS.112  This 
distinction makes the court more likely to be used since potential 
parties to a hearing now better understand the services provided.  
In general, cases brought in the first instance deal with commercial 
issues and those brought in the Appeals division pertain to 
disciplinary matters.113  In addition, the Paris Agreement also 
provided for the court to issue advisory positions, to conduct 
mediation prior to arbitration proceeding, and for the creation of an 
ad hoc division of the CAS that is operative during international 
competitions to resolve disputes in a timely manner.114 
The first ad hoc division was set up for the 1996 Olympic 
Games in Atlanta.115  Since that time, ad hoc divisions have also 
been created for subsequent Olympic Games, the European 
Football Union Championships and the Commonwealth Games.116  
A simpler procedure is used for the ad hoc division so that 
arbitration proceedings can be brought and heard within twenty-
four hours.117 
2. Process Whereby Arbitration Hearings Are Brought Before 
the CAS 
Any aggrieved party can submit a dispute to the CAS if there is 
an arbitration agreement between the parties indicating that either 
or both of the parties has recourse to the court and the dispute is 
related to sports.118  Specifically, the Statutes of the Bodies 
Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes (“Statutes”) 
provides that the Statutes’ “procedural rules apply whenever the 
 
 112 See id. 
 113 See id. 
 114 See id.; see also Court of Arbitration for Sports, Code of Sports-related Arbitration, 
Statutes of the Bodies Working for the Settlement of Sports-related Disputes § 6 
[hereinafter Code of Sports-related Arbitration], available at http://www.tas-
cas.org/en/code/frmco.htm (last visited Feb. 1, 2008). 
 115 See Reeb, supra note 96. 
 116 See id. 
 117 See id. 
 118 See id. 
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parties have agreed to refer a sports-related dispute to the CAS.”119  
“Such disputes may arise out of an arbitration clause inserted in a 
contract or regulations,” or of a subsequent arbitration agreement, 
in the case of ordinary arbitration proceedings.120 
For arbitration proceedings in appeal of matters decided by 
other sports organizations, disputes may “involve an appeal against 
a decision rendered by a federation, association or sports-related 
body where the . . . regulations of such bodies, or a specific 
agreement” between the “parties provides for an appeal to the 
CAS.”121  All of these “disputes may involve matters of principle 
relating to sport or matters of pecuniary or other interests brought 
into play in the practice or the development of sport and . . . any 
[other] activity related or connected to sport.”122  The court 
generally views its jurisdiction broadly.  Indeed, it has never 
declined to exercise jurisdiction when a party has sought 
arbitration before it.123 
3. Appeal of CAS Rulings 
A party to an arbitration proceeding who wants to appeal a 
CAS ruling can only do so when the instrument providing for 
arbitration does not contain a provision precluding such an 
appeal.124  Also, such a party must be domiciled in Switzerland.125  
If the ruling is not going to be carried out in Switzerland or by a 
Swiss entity, the aforementioned provisions from the New York 
Convention can lead a national court where that party is a citizen 
(or if a corporation, is incorporated) to not enforce the ruling. 126  
However, if the ruling were to be carried out in Switzerland or by 
an institution incorporated in Switzerland, such as the IOC, this 
would leave all non-Swiss parties in a worse position vis-a-vis 
Swiss parties to arbitration hearings before the CAS. 
 
 119 See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, § 27. 
 120 Id. 
 121 Id. 
 122 Id. 
 123 See Reeb, supra note 96. 
 124 Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, §§ 46, 59. 
 125 Id. 
 126 See supra notes 64–66 and accompanying text (addressing when a party to the 
Convention does not have to enforce foreign arbitration decisions). 
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II. THE OLYMPIC BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSE 
The Olympic binding arbitration clause introduced for the 1996 
Summer Olympics in Atlanta must be signed by all competitors in 
order for the IOC to confirm their ability to compete.127  Moreover, 
the IOC has attained the acquiescence of all the ISFs it recognizes 
in embracing binding arbitration before the CAS by its 
members.128 
A. Positive Attributes of the Olympic Binding Arbitration Clause 
The Olympic binding arbitration clause presents an efficient 
mechanism for resolving disputes during the Olympic Games.  The 
ad hoc division set up at the respective Olympic Games has not 
charged athletes appealing decisions concerning their ability to 
compete.129  Moreover, most such cases have yielded a decision 
within twenty-four hours.130  Thus the speed and cost of appealing 
a ruling to the CAS were not hindrances for competitors seeking to 
challenge adverse rulings.  Additional positive attributes of the 
CAS are that it is likely to be more neutral than arbitration by ISFs 
and NGBs; the panel is composed of experts in sports law; CAS 
proceedings can be flexible; and the court’s judgments are more 
easily enforceable than those of national court systems.131  Also, 
domestic courts may not have the jurisdiction to hear a case when 
the other party is based in another country.132 
Some attributes of the CAS have both positive and negative 
aspects in comparison with traditional litigation.  While 
confidentiality is generally viewed as a positive aspect of 
arbitration, such confidentiality also yields more uncertainty for 
parties, as they may not be aware of how the CAS has ruled in 
similar cases previously.  Athletes may thus distrust CAS 
proceedings for this reason if they fear that the CAS is 
unpredictable and inconsistent.133 
 
 127 See Raber, supra note 7, at 77. 
 128 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 495. 
 129 See Reeb, supra note 96. 
 130 Id. 
 131 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515. 
 132 See id. 
 133 See Raber, supra note 7, at 95. 
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Just as some attributes of the CAS have both positive and 
negative aspects in comparison with litigation, so too is the court in 
some ways superior to litigation and in some ways inferior to 
litigation in consideration of the same issue.  Having experts on the 
panel may bring efficiency gains as the need for expert witnesses 
may be decreased and may also lead to a more accurate result.134  
However, the more limited discovery procedures of the CAS, as 
compared with litigation in United States courts cuts against the 
possibility of reaching the most accurate and equitable result 
possible.135 
The CAS acts as a replacement to litigation.  When the parties 
agree that the efficiency benefits provided by binding arbitration 
overrides any potential negative aspects of arbitration, these 
negative qualities, including those related to due process 
protections, are of less concern.  Thus when the parties involved 
are commercial entities, who have agreed to bring their dispute to 
the CAS in the first instance, any due process concerns presented 
in losing the right to a jury trial dissipate.  However, in the case of 
Olympic athletes, who are required to sign the Olympic binding 
arbitration clause in order to compete, it is important to analyze the 
due process deficiencies of the CAS.136 
B. Negative Attributes of the Olympic Binding Arbitration 
Clause—Due Process Concerns 
In order for a proceeding to protect procedural due process 
rights, one must be entitled to a hearing and notice of the hearing 
time, date, and content.137  This hearing should be “in front of a 
neutral decision-maker” and should provide “an opportunity to 
make an oral presentation, to present favorable evidence and to 
 
 134 See id. at 94. 
 135 See id.; see also Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515–16. 
 136 In the case of prospective Olympic athletes who are required to sign the Olympic 
binding arbitration clause in order to compete, there are actually two issues.  The first is 
whether the provision should be struck for violating common law contractual doctrines.  
Assuming arguendo that the provision will not be struck, one must then analyze the due 
process protections provided by the CAS itself since it, in effect, is supplanting the right 
to a trial. 
 137 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 497. 
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confront and cross-examine adverse witnesses.”138  Since the 
Statutes of the CAS do not provide for the cross-examination of 
adverse witnesses and fundamental rights of Olympic athletes to 
engage in their employment are at stake, it could be argued that the 
CAS fails to provide adequate procedural due process 
protections.139  In Part III.C. I will discuss a current hearing, in 
which the impartiality of an arbitrator was at issue, thereby 
threatening the procedural due process rights of the athletes. 
An additional issue touching on the neutrality of the CAS is its 
funding.  The CAS receives its funding from the ICAS.  It remains 
unclear, however, how the ICAS is funded.140  If ICAS funding can 
be traced to the IOC, the World Anti-Doping Agency (“WADA”), 
NOCs, or ISFs, the independence and impartiality of the CAS 
would then be in question. 
Substantive due process focuses on whether a rule or regulation 
“is fair and reasonable and clearly relevant to the accomplishment 
of its purpose.”141  Courts will review the rules of sports bodies 
only in a limited number of situations.  The courts will review the 
rules of sports bodies when a rule violates public policy by being 
fraudulent or unreasonable.142  They will also review when an 
organization’s rules or regulations exceed the organization’s 
authority, or when the organization violates one of its own rules.143  
Finally, the courts will review when the rules in question are 
applied unreasonably or arbitrarily, or violate an individual’s 
constitutional rights.144 
Perhaps the biggest reason for concern with the CAS is the 
CAS Statute provision affording Swiss persons the right to appeal 
CAS rulings in the absence of provisions stating that CAS 
decisions will not be appealed by either of the parties.145  Since 
non-Swiss persons do not have this right, and the IOC is 
 
 138 Id. 
 139 See generally Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114; see also Bitting, 
supra note 14, at 664. 
 140 See Raber, supra note 7, at 89. 
 141 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 497. 
 142 Id. 
 143 Id. 
 144 Id. at 498. 
 145 See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, § 46, 59. 
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incorporated in Switzerland, in any case involving the IOC and a 
non-Swiss person, there is a very strong argument that the rule 
violates public policy by being unreasonable.146  Moreover, if an 
arbitration hearing violates fundamental notions of fairness, it 
cannot be said that the proceeding provides substantive due 
process.  Because of the aforementioned CAS Statute, therefore, 
the CAS arguably does not protect the substantive due process 
rights of non-Swiss parties for hearings involving either the IOC, 
or any other Swiss person or corporation. 
The main due process concerns presented by the Olympic 
binding arbitration agreement flow from the nature of the CAS.  If 
the CAS could provide the same procedural safeguards that other 
courts of law provide, there would be less of a threat to the rights 
of competitors.  As Bitting notes, since the Olympic athlete can be 
regarded as a professional, his rights should receive the same 
protections as an employee who is compelled to accept binding 
arbitration as a condition of employment.147  Even if the CAS is 
able to alleviate these due process concerns, common law 
contractual doctrines still may cause American courts to strike the 
Olympic arbitration clause from contracts entered into by Olympic 
competitors.148  Nonetheless, some recent cases shed light as to 
competitor concerns about the CAS. 
C. Potential Due Process Violations and the Court of Arbitration 
for Sport 
The recent case between the International Association of 
Athletics Federation (“IAAF”) and Greek sprinters Kostas Kenteris 
and Katerina Thanou is illustrative of the problems still plaguing 
the CAS.  The IAAF had suspended the sprinters from the Athens 
Olympics for failure to appear at a drug test.  Upon appeal, a Greek 
 
 146 It could also be argued that the CAS’s rulings are subject to review insofar as 
affording a right to only one party in an arbitration amounts to unreasonable or arbitrary 
application of the rules. 
 147 See Bitting, supra note 14, at 666–67. 
 148 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 503–05 (discussing whether the Olympic 
binding arbitration clause may be voided by American courts because it violates common 
law contractual doctrines); see also Bitting, supra note 14, at 667–77; see also PERILLO, 
supra note 73, §§ 8.2, 9.2, 9.9, 9.38, 9.40 (discussing common law contractual 
principles). 
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Athletics Federation disciplinary panel reversed the suspension.149  
The athletes appealed the selection of arbitrators because one of 
the three arbitrators, Yves Fortier, worked for a law firm that 
represented the WADA, thereby presenting a potential conflict of 
interest.150  This episode may stand for the notion that the CAS 
provides adequate avenues for potential conflicts of interest to be 
remedied, as a new arbitration board is in the process of being 
established to hear the case.  However, it was not at the behest of 
the CAS that the new board was established.151  Rather, Fortier 
resigned from the arbitration panel so that the sprinters would feel 
confident that the hearing was not tainted by a potential conflict of 
interest.152 
While it is unclear whether the CAS would have replaced 
Fortier on its own accord, the court stated that it had confidence in 
Fortier’s independence and impartiality.153  It is thus at least 
questionable whether the CAS would have taken affirmative steps 
to protect the organization from the hint of a conflict of interest.  
The incident also illustrates that, though the CAS provides better 
procedural due process protections than it did prior to the Paris 
Agreement when the CAS was an arm of the IOC, these 
protections are still not as strong as they need to be.  While the due 
process protections of the Greek sprinters were protected, in all 
other cases that Fortier was an arbitrator, parties may not have had 
sufficient procedural due process protections because the 
impartiality and independence of arbitration panels that Fortier was 
a member of is questionable.154  While the Greek sprinters case155 
 
 149 Sprint Duo Drop Drugs Ban Appeals, BBC SPORT, June 26, 2006, 
http://news.bbc.co.uk/sport1/hi/athletics/5118074.stm [hereinafter “Sprint Duo”]. 
 150 Martin King, Recent Decisions and Issues in the Court of Arbitration for Sport, 
ARBITRATION WORLD, Summer 2006, at 4, 5. 
 151 Id. at 5–6. 
 152 Id. at 6. 
 153 Id. 
 154 See id. (noting that Tim Montgomery is appealing the verdict from his hearing before 
the CAS because of Fortier’s failure to disclose his law firm’s relationship with the 
World Anti-Doping Agency creating the possibility that the result achieved may not have 
been an impartial one). 
 155 Sprint Duo, supra  note 149.  On the eve of the CAS hearing before a reconstituted 
arbitration panel in June 2006, the IAAF and the sprinters settled the case, thus avoiding 
a CAS ruling. 
04_GUBI_031208_FINAL 3/12/2008  7:12:45 PM 
2008] THE OLYMPIC BINDING ARBITRATION CLAUSE 1021 
 
provides an example of procedural due process rights being put in 
jeopardy, the case of American skeleton team member Zachery 
Lund provides an example of substantive due process rights 
potentially not being protected by the CAS. 
Lund was found to be in violation of the anti-doping rules for 
using Proscar and Propecia to combat the effects of male pattern 
baldness.156  The sole ingredient of these medicines is Finasteride, 
which has been on the list of banned substances as a masking agent 
since January 2005.157  Lund’s mistake in the case amounted to a 
failure to thoroughly search the Federation Internationale de 
Bobsleigh et Tobogganing (“FIBT”) website for a list of banned 
substances.  No party has alleged that Lund’s use of Finasteride 
was with the intent of gaining an advantage over a competitor, nor 
of concealing the use of performance enhancing substances.158  
One who is trying to conceal the use of performance enhancing 
substances would not list the use of a masking agent on a Drug 
Control Form because the use of a masking agent is similarly 
punishable by WADA.159  Rather, Lund had used these medicines 
for years because they help stem the degree of his baldness.  
Moreover, he has continuously listed his use of the medicines on 
the Doping Control Form.160 
Lund had participated in competitions in 2005 prior to the 
November 2005 World Cup, in which he was ultimately found to 
have committed a doping violation.161  He listed his use of anti-
baldness drugs at all competitions.162  Because of his honesty, the 
fact that no one believed he was using the drugs to gain a 
competitive advantage, and the perceived failure of the anti-doping 
agencies to detect his violation sooner, the usually mandatory two-
year prohibition on competing was reduced to one year.163  Though 
the CAS did not impose the ordinarily mandated two-year ban 
 
 156 See World Anti-Doping Agency v. Lund, Ct. of Arb. for Sport, CAS arbitration No. 
CAS 06/001, at 5 (2006). 
 157 See id. 
 158 See id. 
 159 See generally id. 
 160 See id. at 9. 
 161 Cf. id. 
 162 Cf. id. 
 163 See id. at 9–10. 
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from competition, there may still have been a substantive due 
process violation in the case. 
Should Lund elect to appeal the CAS ruling in a United States 
court, he may prevail because the totality of the circumstances 
indicates that the court’s application of the rules in question may 
have been unreasonable or arbitrary.  Had Lund’s violation been 
detected earlier in the year, he would have been able to compete in 
the Turin Olympics.  As a result of the system’s failure and Lund’s 
honest mistake, he missed his opportunity to compete. 
III. IMPROVING THE COURT OF ARBITRATION FOR SPORT 
A main difference between the Olympic binding arbitration 
requirement and the Amateur Sports Act provision that requires 
binding arbitration is that the Olympic provision pertains to all 
disputes brought by competitors.164  The Amateur Sports Act 
provision, on the other hand, only pertains to disputes arising 
within twenty-one days of the beginning of an international 
competition.165  For this reason, the due process concerns created 
by the structure and operation of the CAS are greater than those 
presented by the Amateur Sports Act. 
Going forward, the CAS will likely play an ever-increasing 
role in resolution of sports law disputes.  It is thus imperative that 
the CAS ameliorate the areas in which its due process protections 
are not sufficient.  There are many fairly simple steps the ICAS 
can take to cure sources of due process concerns with the CAS.166  
Publishing CAS decisions, allowing for greater discovery, 
including the cross-examination of adverse witnesses, providing 
athletes with more information regarding rights and resources 
available to them, and ensuring that the arbitrator lists include 
people from diverse backgrounds will all help increase athlete 
confidence in the court.167  I will now address a few of the issues 
raised in this paper. 
 
 164 See Bitting, supra note 14, at 663. 
 165 See Amateur Sports Act, 36 U.S.C. § 220509 (2006). 
 166 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515; see also Raber, supra note 7, at 96–97. 
 167 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 515; see also Raber, supra note 7, at 96–97. 
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For disciplinary matters that arise after the completion of a 
competition, I do not believe there is a sufficient reason to require 
that athletes agree to binding arbitration.  Binding arbitration 
during the Olympic Games is mainly defensible because of how 
quickly a decision can be reached in comparison with lengthy 
trials, thereby allowing competitions to be held in a timely manner.  
But if the infraction is detected subsequent to competition, this 
interest is no longer as paramount, and then the athlete’s interest in 
protecting his due process rights should trump the desire for a swift 
verdict. 
Also, the decision to have binding arbitration before the CAS is 
one better achieved through mutual consensus.  So, when this 
mutual consensus is not present, the international sports law 
system should protect athlete rights, since it is their livelihood that 
is often at stake.  On the other hand, when parties negotiate for 
binding arbitration from positions of equal footing, there is no 
reason not to prohibit appeal from CAS rulings.  Moreover, it is 
unlikely that national judicial systems will assert jurisdiction in 
most cases because of the general belief that sports are better left 
outside of the courtroom. 
Indeed, arbitration before the CAS could still be required, but 
with a provision allowing for a full trial should certain triggering 
conditions be met.  Thus, even if the only thing the IOC requires is 
that parties consent to arbitration prior to engaging in litigation, 
this may be sufficient to keep most cases out of national court 
systems.  Leaving the litigation avenue open to prospective 
Olympic athletes will also make athletes more confident in the 
fairness of CAS proceedings since they will know that they can 
appeal if they find the procedural safeguards of the court lacking.  
If athletes are more confident in the fairness of CAS proceedings, 
they will probably pursue more matters in the CAS, even when not 
required to do so. 
A second main issue the CAS should address is its source of 
funding.  The court’s independence has been questioned because 
the IOC previously funded the court and it is not currently known 
how the CAS is funded.  While the ICAS was created to ensure the 
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financial independence of the CAS,168 if the ICAS is funded by the 
IOC, this extra layer of bureaucracy could merely be masking a 
continued IOC role in funding the CAS.  Clarifying the court’s 
sources of funding would put practitioners and athletes at ease that 
the court is sufficiently financially independent.  A possible source 
of funding for the CAS could be from raising the fees it charges.  
A second potential source could be the NOCs, who in general side 
with the athletes in disciplinary matters.  If the source of the 
funding is the committees that want their athletes to be able to 
compete, potential competitors will be less concerned about the 
financial independence of the CAS. 
Next, the flaw in the CAS statutes allowing for appeal of CAS 
rulings by Swiss citizens or those having a “domicile, habitual 
residence, or business establishment in Switzerland” when there is 
not an express provision preventing such a right of appeal should 
be closed.169  If the CAS really wishes to attain the esteem of the 
entire sports and legal community, different rules should not be 
applied to Swiss citizens or those with substantial connections to 
Switzerland, as compared with those lacking such a relationship 
with Switzerland. 
Finally, when the neutrality of CAS arbitrators is questionable, 
the CAS should be willing to reopen such cases or assign new 
arbitration panels as appropriate.  The episode involving the Greek 
sprinters makes clear that no judicial body is perfect.  The CAS 
could have served its interest in promoting confidence in the 
impartiality of arbitration boards much better had it requested Mr. 
Fortier to resign and allowed the reopening of the Montgomery 
case before a different arbitration panel. 
 
 168 See Naidoo & Sarin, supra note 5, at 502; see also Reeb, supra note 96. 
 169 See Code of Sports-related Arbitration, supra note 114, §§ 46, 59 (noting that awards 
“may not be challenged by way of an action for setting aside to the extent that the parties 
have no domicile, habitual residence, or business establishment in Switzerland.”). 
